in a technocratic state, these scientists were engaged with the more theoretical question of whether the practice of science itself could provide a model for democratic society. David Hollinger has demonstrated the deep commitment of scientists on the progressive left to a notion of the "scientific ethos" that stressed the egalitarianism and high moral standards of the scientific community. Commentators as varied as the philosopher Sidney Hook, the biologist C. H. Waddington, and, most famously, the sociologist Robert Merton, all agreed that there was some sort of natural connection-however ill-definedbetween the scientific enterprise and democratic political culture. 5 In recent years a number of scholars have turned their attention to the tension between these ideals of an enlightened, authoritative scientific community and a Cold War culture that was increasingly suspicious of individual political motives and actions. In Charles Thorpe's biography of J. Robert Oppenheimer, for example, we see how the Manhattan Project scientist attempted to construct an identity based as much on his personal charisma as on his scientific mettle, and how this strategy ultimately soured in the environment of heightened suspicion that characterized the postwar political climate. 6 In Jessica Wang's account of the atomic scientists' thwarted efforts to take their message of peaceful uses of atomic energy to schoolchildren, Kiwanis Clubs, and church groups, we see the harsh glare of the surveillance state monitoring the public relations efforts of scientific professionals. 7 Elsewhere in Wang's work and in that of sociologist Kelly Moore, we see the growing reluctance of professional scientific societies to participate in civil discourse, whether out of fear of investigation, reluctance to alienate potential allies or funding agencies, or, in some cases, personal aversion to controversy among the societies' elected officers. 8 Like much of the scholarship on science and the Cold War, these recent studies have mostly focused on the actions of physical scientists, whose interventions into matters of public policy were on issues whose importance was self-evident to the state. But what of the biologists? Aside from the teachings of a few radicals, Lysenkoism had few supporters on American shores. In the face of what seemed to be growing evidence of executions and disappearances among their colleagues in the Soviet Union, opposition to Lysenkoism-and the political structures that enabled it-should have been an issue around which even the most consensus-minded geneticist could rally. With its elements of human drama and political intrigue, the issue seemed tailor-made to attract media coverage. Yet, for a variety of reasons, the American genetics community as a whole chose largely to stand on the sidelines. Those few scientists who attempted to rouse a sense of outrage among their colleagues in the Genetics Society of America (GSA) were met with silence or polite demurrals. Those geneticists who did attempt a campaign against Lysenkoism turned to the popular press, not scientific journals, and they hoped to attract attention to their cause without mentioning the Communist Party. Eventually, concerned about the public actions of rogue elements insistent on action, the GSA turned to a public relations firm to highlight the achievements of Western genetics as part of a plan to condemn Lysenko without even mentioning his name. This episode raises important questions about the limits of scientists' roles as public figures, both as individuals and as members of scientific institutions. Beyond its importance to the history of science in the Cold War, it provides insight into the mechanisms of public relations during a time when the very notion of "science and the public" was changing. What did scientists hope to accomplish by bringing their argument directly to the public, in the form of mass media, rather than to their scientific peers? Was the public merely to listen and acquiesce, or were disagreements welcome? How are we to understand the geneticists' refusal to condemn Lysenko publicly, when their private correspondence makes clear he was their central target? What were the terms under which scientists were expected to engage in controversial discussions, whether scientific or political? 9
OPE N I N G SALVO S : T R A N S L AT I N G H E R E D I T Y A N D I T S VA R I A B I L I T Y
One might have expected Theodosius Dobzhansky to have spent July 4, 1945, celebrating Independence Day with his wife, Natasha, and their daughter, Sophia. Both Theodosius (Dodek to his friends) and Natasha had emigrated 9. The cultural authority of science and medicine is a concept that underlies most work by historians of American science and medicine today. from the Ukraine to the United States in the 1920s and thoroughly enjoyed the more outlandish aspects of American culture. Summers involved cross-country drives from New York City to Mather, California, where Dobzhansky divided his time between horseback riding and collecting fruit flies in the wild. 10 On this particular morning, he had driven all night from Berkeley to protect a load of flies from the heat of the San Joaquin Desert. This time the hiking and riding, however, were tempered by the mixed news he carried along with the flies: Lysenko's position seemed less secure, but Soviet geneticists Nikolai Vavilov, Georgi Karpechenko, and G. Levizky were almost certainly dead.
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Genetics news from the Soviet Union-and indeed, much of Europe-had been sporadic throughout World War II. This much, however, was clear: Trofim Lysenko, an opponent of Western genetics (as he called it, "MendelismMorganism-Weismannism"), had taken charge of much of Soviet agricultural research. As director of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, he headed twenty-four research institutes and a number of affiliates. Lysenko opposed the work of Western geneticists on the grounds that their theoretical investigations offered no practical applications and therefore directly interfered with the work of the people. He argued that his own scientific contributions, in contrast, held the potential to transform Soviet agricultural production. His most notorious theories included wheat vernalization, in which spring wheat was transformed into winter wheat through environmental "education," and vegetative hybridization, in which hybrid offspring were produced through grafting.
Most Western geneticists dismissed these results as ridiculous. Lysenko himself could not be so easily dismissed. His position as director of the Agricultural Academy suggested the extent of his influence. More worrisome were his attempts to dismantle Western genetics within the Soviet Union. Many American geneticists had known and worked with these Soviet geneticists for many years and considered them friends. But at the same time that they mourned the fate of their colleagues, Dobzhansky and his Columbia University colleague Leslie C. Dunn believed that there might be cracks in Lysenko's grip on power and thought that the time for action was at hand. The situation was complicated, however, by their lack of knowledge of the situation on the ground. If their colleagues were still alive, Western diatribes against Lysenko might endanger their lives. Moreover, Dunn, like many members of the biological community in both the United States and Great Britain, was committed to leftist politics and was reluctant to be seen as criticizing the Communist Party.
12 Nevertheless, Dobzhansky and Dunn agreed that it would be better for support for Soviet geneticists to come from quarters sympathetic to Marxism, and Dunn somewhat reluctantly agreed to accept the mantle as an American spokesperson against Lysenkoism.
Dunn might have been willing to enter the battle, but his and Dobzhansky's weapon of choice seems-at least in retrospect-somewhat peculiar. Drawing on ideas of scientific objectivity and disinterestedness, Dunn and Dobzhansky believed that the best way to combat Lysenkoism was to let the Soviet scientist speak for himself. They therefore embarked on a translation of Lysenko's bestknown work, Heredity and Its Variability. Dobzhansky acted as translator; Dunn attempted to secure a publisher for the work. Dobzhansky found translating Lysenko's work profoundly depressing, and his desire to avoid the topic had slowed the work's progress. In a letter to Dunn explaining his tardiness, he wrote, "Translating it has been one of the most unpleasant tasks I had in my whole life, and surely I would never undertake a thing like that for the money-it can be done only for a 'cause.'" Dunn attempted to interest Simon and Schuster in the manuscript, but the publisher turned him down, citing a limited market. When he pitched it to King's Crown Press, a division of Columbia University Press, Dunn stressed that while the Lysenko controversy had attracted much media attention, "chiefly in the political press," reporters and readers had been unable to evaluate Lysenko's actual scientific experiments. In Dunn's estimation, the translation's value lay in its ability to "place Lysenko's views directly before the American public so they may draw their own conclusions concerning his work." 14 The two truly intended the volume to stand alone; Dobzhansky resisted Dunn's offers to write an introduction himself or solicit one from former Vice President and Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace. 15 (Wallace was deeply interested in Lysenko's work and had expressed curiosity about its potential applications; he was, of course, also known as a friend of the left.) Dobzhansky's reluctance stemmed partially from his desire to keep Dunn's and Wallace's names from being associated with Lysenko's experiments, but it also reflected Dobzhansky's feeling that the facts should speak for themselves: "Let him stand on his own feet." 16 The eventual volume included only a minimalist translator's preface in which Dobzhansky explained the reason for the undertaking and indicated that he objected to Lysenko's work. By the end of the summer, Dobzhansky's translation was complete, and King's Crown Press had agreed to publish 4,000 copies in pamphlet form for fifty cents each.
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At the same time that Dobzhansky and Dunn wanted the volume to stand alone, they realized that successful publication would require publicity-and even more important, the right kind of publicity. Although they seemed to be directing their energies toward the public at large by publishing the book in pamphlet form, If Dunn had initially hoped that readers would approach the translation in the same objective spirit that scientists supposedly approached their experiments, he was beginning to realize that a more sophisticated strategy might be necessary. When corresponding with the scientific press, he maintained the position that his sympathy for the Soviet cause proved his objectivity as a reviewer. In his cover letter to his unsolicited Science review, for example, Dunn wrote, "Because of my position and known sympathy with the development of science in the U.S.S.R., such criticism, as contained in the review, cannot be attributed to animosity or prejudice but merely to a desire to judge Russian scientific work by the same standards by which other scientific work is judged."
24 When presenting the issue to Kaempffert at the New York Times, however, Dunn explicitly acknowledged that his objectivity was itself a strategy:
You will probably want to refer to the motives which American geneticists had in bringing out Lysenko's book in English. There are two points of view here. Some American scientists thought it better not to dignify Lysenko's rather vague and mystical ideas by serious treatment and criticism. The other point of view rejects this as not conforming to the usual method of science which insists that what is criticized must be thoroughly understood first. Since I belong to this latter group, I believe that objective discussion of the scientific and practical bases of Lysenko's theories will eventually be a worthy service to Soviet science. The fact that it may be used as a whip by those who wish to abuse the Soviet Union I think matters less, since it will have a temporary effect. Dunn's explanation to Kaempffert is slightly disingenuous. He does not mention, for example, that he is one of only two American geneticists who brought about the book's publication. And while true that the volume was published in the interest of understanding Lysenko's work and not merely as an act of criticism, Dunn's correspondence with Dobzhansky makes clear that publication was also meant to aid in Lysenko's annihilation. Even so, Dunn's broader point about divergent strategies within the American genetics community rings true. While Dunn, Dobzhansky, and Muller formed the core of a group who hoped to use publicity to ameliorate the crisis in Soviet genetics, a large contingent of the GSA argued that ignoring Lysenko offered the best hope for his destruction.
From this perspective, Dunn's and Dobzhansky's attempts to publicize Lysenko's works can be considered a fundamentally radical act. Rather than simply counter bad science with good science, they acknowledged that it might take more than the scientific method to achieve public support for their goals. Yet Dunn's position was complicated by his remaining political allegiances. He was infuriated, for example, when he read Robert Simpson's review of the translation in the March 1946 issue of the Saturday Review of Literature.
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Simpson made the cardinal error, from Dunn's perspective, of claiming "that Lysenko is typical of science in the Soviet Union." Dunn's three-page letter to the editor seethed that "one should no more view the whole of Russian science through the lens of Lysenko, than one should view American science through fundamentalist writings on evolution." 27 Dunn's public response to Simpson's review exposed him to additional criticism, and Simpson took the bait: Simpson's response implied that Dunn's comparison of Soviet and American scientific politics amounted to an apologetic defense of "Russian totalitarian politicians." 28 The political atmosphere of 1946, with growing tensions between Communism and democracy, held no patience for Dunn's careful distinctions between Lysenkoism and the rest of Soviet science.
Dunn's and Dobzhansky's publishing strategy was based on scientific ideals of open-mindedness and objectivity. They drew the line at actually condemning either Lysenko's scientific theories or his political power, hoping instead that an informed general public would draw its own conclusions. But by 1948 any hope that Western scientific criticisms of Lysenko's science might reduce his power was shattered. In August of that year, Lysenko announced that his theories had received the official endorsement of the Communist Party.
29 Within a month's time, the Soviet Academy of Sciences had removed the remaining leaders of Soviet genetics from their posts at leading research institutes.
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Lysenkoism had become a political, not a scientific, problem.
TO TH E BAR R I CA D E S : B R OA D S I D E S A N D D I AT R I B E S
The news of August 1948 galvanized the genetics community. Dobzhansky, upon hearing it while on sabbatical in Brazil, moaned, "I am lost to invent what to do, especially while sitting here, so far from the center of things!" At this point, he felt Western geneticists had no choice but condemnation: "If we do not speak out then stones shall speak!" He dashed off letters to his colleagues, asking whether the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), or the National Academies, or the GSA, or someone might make some sort of statement. 31 Muller, newly minted as a Nobel Laureate, wholeheartedly agreed and urged Dobzhansky to draft a statement to be signed by himself, as president of the American Society for Human Genetics (ASHG), and L. H. Snyder, the president of the GSA, the two most important professional organizations for American geneticists. 32 Muller wasted no time in taking individual action. On September 24, 1948, Muller publicly resigned from the Soviet Academy of Sciences in a letter widely quoted by the American press. He referred to the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Academy as "disgraceful" and compared them to Nazis. Dobzhansky, meanwhile, had prepared the requested statement for the signature of the executive committees of the GSA and the ASHG. Muller had originally suggested that the signed statement be printed in Science, or the New York Times, or both. 34 Muller was so taken with the statement, however, that he attempted to use it to rally a larger fraction of the biological community. Rather than simply sign the statement himself and hope for Snyder's signature, Muller shared it with his Indiana University colleague Ralph Cleland, the chairman of the governing board of the American Institute of Biological Sciences. 35 As the professional umbrella group for the biological sciences, the AIBS nominally represented the views of 80,000 American university scientists, government researchers, and college and high school teachers. with certainty the American biological community's opposition to Lysenko's scientific theories. The original statement that Dobzhansky wrote for Muller dismissed Lysenko's theories as anachronistic and unscientific. Unlike Dobzhansky's translation of Heredity and Its Variability, which merely presented Lysenko's scientific experiments and left the reader to draw his or her own conclusions, the AIBS statement proclaimed Lysenko to be a fraud. His experiments had been conducted in a way which clearly demonstrated "that Lysenko is either unfamiliar with, or else is willfully ignoring, the basic facts and the methods of investigation of the sciences which he presumes to negate." Such behavior demanded that American scientists denounce Lysenko's work as pure charlatanism: "It is in reality a conflict of outworn notions closely approaching superstition against science."
36 While the statement stopped short of actually condemning Lysenko's political power, it castigated the sort of government that elected not only to decide scientific controversies but also dismiss dissenting scientists.
The AIBS's governing board made several critical revisions before circulating Dobzhansky's statement to the American Society of Naturalists, the Society for the Study of Evolution, the ASHG, and the GSA. Their revised statement, which directly referred to "official Communist views on heredity," encountered substantial resistance within the GSA's executive committee. The dissenting members of the committee felt the document overstated the case, but more importantly, they questioned the authority of a professional society to issue a political statement on behalf of its members. Science, moreover, declined to publish the statement until July of the following year, severely limiting its effectiveness. The AIBS's difficulty in gaining acceptance and publicity for such a seemingly obvious action-the condemnation of the hijacking of science by politics-deserves further explanation.
It had become clear within two weeks that the GSA's executive committee would not reach consensus. underscored the obstacles to a scientific organization's involvement in political activities. While Beadle more or less agreed with the statement itself, he felt the entire society, rather than simply the executive committee, should approve the statement. Stern, on the other hand, objected to the statement's "politically colored sentences" and "unverified statements." Both thought the document had overstated the case. 38 Nevertheless, at some point in the spring of 1949 (the record is unclear as to exactly when or why), the GSA's executive committee relented and agreed to endorse the document. There was now a new problem: George Baitsell, the editor of Science, refused to publish it, on the grounds that the journal had already published too much on the topic. 39 Science did eventually publish the statement in June, nearly ten months after Lysenko's triumph, but for Muller, this experience only reinforced his conviction that geneticists needed to aggressively market their individual opinions. 40 Indeed, Muller saw a vast conspiracy in Baitsell's decision to delay publication and spread the blame to Bentley Glass, his former student and the current representative for biology on the AAAS editorial committee. Calling Glass's failure to stand up for the geneticists' interests "very reprehensible," Muller claimed that Glass "obviously let Baitsell put it over on him, believing Baitsell's pretexts and not seeing that Baitsell was really anti-genetic himself."
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Muller's interpretation notwithstanding, the GSA executive committee's reluctance to endorse the statement most likely grew from their fear of appearing dogmatic, not from secret commitments to Communism. 42 The second article more ominously described the threat of Lysenko beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union, including the United States-"particularly in the sections where Communist influence is strong." Foreshadowing his conflict with Science magazine, Muller claimed that scientists who had attempted to criticize Lysenko "have had considerable difficulty getting their articles published, even in the USA and Britain." The article explained the ideological underpinnings of dialectical materialism and the "perennial existence within 43 the USSR of an emotional state resembling war hysteria," both of which, according to Muller, required unyielding subservience to authority. But the danger was not limited to the Soviet Union. Illustrated with a photograph of Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan, the well-known protagonists of the Scopes trial, the article warned that a scientific illiteracy enforced by religious fundamentalists had fostered a "popular misunderstanding" of genetics and heredity. Indeed, Muller warned, the failure of schools to adequately teach biological evolution had produced an ignorant and gullible population, a mistake that "may at some future time facilitate the rise of Lysenkoism and other dangerous anti-scientific movements." 45 To Muller's consternation, the Saturday Review received many letters criticizing both the content and the tone of his articles. S. F. Thomas, of Palo Alto, California, "condemned" Muller's "lack of scientific approach" and his "emotional taint." Similarly, A. I. Friedman, of Hackensack, New Jersey, accused Muller of the "same sort of political invective which he accuses the USSR." William S. Maxwell of Philadelphia agreed, commenting that he "was not favorably impressed by the vehemence with which Mr. Muller denounced Soviet theories of genetics, without once offering any really conclusive evidence of why he thought they were unsound." Of the seven letters the Saturday Review published in response to Muller's articles, only one offered unqualified support. 46 Muller encountered similar responses from readers when he engaged in a printed debate with George Bernard Shaw several months later. 47 These criticisms pointed to the flip side of Dunn's limited approach to criticizing Lysenko. When Dunn simply focused on Lysenko's science, he worried that readers might miss the point; but when Muller focused exclusively on Lysenko's politics, he drew criticism for leaving the sphere of science.
In a fascinating exchange of letters in early 1949 that echoed the battles of the American left in the 1930s, Muller and Dunn compared their views on how they should approach the Lysenko problem. Muller thought Dunn's criticisms of Lysenko did not go far enough, and he urged Dunn to overcome his sympathy for the Soviet position. Writing as one old socialist to another, Muller chided Dunn, "Let me say that I do not think there is the slightest chance for reconciliation with the Soviet authorities over this matter-it has been tried 45 for some thirteen years now-and I think all which is left is to call a spade a spade." Although he ceded Dunn's point that Lysenkoism differed significantly from Nazi genetics-a claim Muller made on multiple occasions that particularly irritated Dunn-he worried that Lysenkoism presented a "slippery slope" for totalitarian regimes. 48 Dunn thanked Muller for his comments and concerns, but reiterated his belief that American geneticists were most effective when they limited their role to "pointing out the problem." Instead of relentlessly criticizing either Lysenko or the Soviet political system, Dunn preferred that they "try to discover and describe just what those views were and are." 49 Regardless of their differing philosophies on the most appropriate way to counter Lysenko's influence, both Muller and Dunn were successful at finding outlets for their views. Speaking as individuals rather than scientists, they condemned Lysenko's power in the Soviet Union. Dunn, who was not quite ready to give up on the Soviet experiment, particularly wanted to prevent the development of a stereotype of Soviet science; Muller, on the other hand, feared the arrival of Communist authority on American shores. They found it more difficult to integrate their views-and those of their colleagues-within the framework of a professional organization.
TH E PR O F E S S I O N A L P O I N T O F V I E W : COM M E M O RAT I O N A S P O L I T I CA L W E A P O N
While the GSA's executive committee considered the fate of the AIBS statement, Tracy Sonneborn, the acting president, suggested that the organization create a committee to address the problem directly. Sonneborn had himself become involved in the controversy, mostly against his will. In late 1948 Sonneborn discovered that Communists abroad were using his research on cytoplasmic inheritance to bolster support for Lysenko's theories. An avid anti-Marxist since college, Sonneborn was furious when he then learned that several daily and weekly newspapers, including Newsweek and the New York Post, had used his work to suggest some of Lysenko's work might be valid. What was more, the British cytologist Cyril Darlington told Sonneborn that European papers portrayed his work as directly in support of Lysenko's stance. These rumors compelled Sonneborn to respond, and in October, he recorded a broadcast for Sonneborn decided to enlist help in his battle against the Communistshence the creation of the wonderfully named "Committee to Counteract AntiGenetics Propaganda" (CCAGP). Sonneborn envisioned his committee as a public relations clearinghouse, so he suggested appointing members who would be ready and able to speak to a broad audience. Besides Muller and Dobzhansky, Sonneborn indicated a preference for Robert C. Cook and Bentley Glass. Cook and Glass, he explained, "could help a great deal" through their editorial roles at Science, Scientific Monthly, and the Journal of Heredity. 51 Cook edited the latter and Glass had recently joined the editorial committees of Scientific Monthly and Science. In suggesting that the committee recruit Cook and Glass specifically for their editorial roles, Sonneborn admitted that their plan to publicly condemn Lysenko might face resistance within the scientific community. It is, however, telling that no one at the GSA thought to enlist the services of either a professional press agency or Science Service, a news syndication service with institutional ties to AAAS and other science organizations.
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By February 1949 the committee was up and running. 53 All four of Sonneborn's nominees accepted membership, and the group began to monitor the American and foreign press closely for signs of expansion in Lysenko's power. They compiled bibliographies, wrote op-ed pieces, and personally lobbied their colleagues to take stronger action. Muller's special contribution was to organize a six-part Voice of America series featuring himself and five other geneticists. The committee encountered a more structural problem in the definition of their responsibilities. Echoing their earlier concerns about the propriety of signing the AIBS statement without the full membership's approval, the executive committee prevented the committee from speaking on behalf of the GSA. The GSA's treasurer-secretary, M. Robert Irwin, who had been attempting to limit the committee's powers since its inception, made his particular opposition known at the annual meeting of the GSA in December 1948. The stalemate continued throughout 1949, even as Sonneborn convinced the executive committee that some sort of public platform had become increasingly necessary. His impassioned letter requested the creation of a new committee with "representatives authorized to speak and act in the name of the Society on matters of sufficient importance to warrant Society action or expression of opinion." Although he mentioned the Lysenko controversy, he also pointed to political investigations of geneticists and ongoing concerns about genetic radiation. His letter is worth quoting at length for its comparisons to broader forms of governance:
I am well aware that such a Committee, no matter how carefully selected, could never hope to have the complete agreement of the Society on its views and actions. Nevertheless, this seems to be insufficient reason to oppose the idea. In a democracy we do not expect 100% agreement on foreign or domestic policy, yet we have representatives who act and speak for the whole nation. If we were to insist on 100% approval before action were taken, either in Government or in our Society, there would be no action at all. The dissident members will, moreover, always have the right and opportunity to express publicly their dissent. 56 After complex negotiations within the society and a general election at the December 1949 meeting, it was eventually agreed that the CCAGP would be folded into a "Committee of Nine," consisting of themselves and the executive committee, and that would in turn design a successor committee to broach the broader topic of scientific freedom and public education. The original four members might or might not form the core of the resulting committee, depending on the results of a general election of the GSA membership. 57 Moreover, the committee would only be allowed to speak for itself, not on behalf of the Society at large. 58 Muller and Cook agreed to continue to serve, albeit reluctantly. Muller "doubt[ed] very much whether, under the hampering conditions imposed at the last meeting of the Society, the Committee can any longer accomplish anything of value."
59 Cook seconded with a loud "AMEN!" scrawled across his letter. 60 Glass, while less adamant, held similar doubts. most mundane level, Huskins, Stadler, and Sturtevant stressed the importance of clarifying the committee's relationship with the GSA as a whole. Muller and Cook, predictably, warned of dire consequences if the committee had to wait for GSA approval. Glass, Lederberg, and Plough, on the other hand, warned that the committee should be careful not to establish its own brand of dogma in the process of combating Lysenkoism. Luria, the odd man out, suggested the committee take a broad view of public education and mount a campaign against racism in American society. 62 The GSA membership apparently agreed with Muller, and he, Sturtevant, Glass, Cook, and Stadler (in order of votes received) were elected to the committee in December 1950. 63 To put this another way: it took the GSA nearly two years-from the time that Sonneborn, as acting president, proposed a committee authorized to speak on public issues-to create it. During this time, however, the GSA was hardly silent on the issue of Lysenkoism. Instead of endorsing its members' antiLysenkoist activities, the society orchestrated an event more palatable to its controversy-shy members: a massive celebration of the achievements of Western genetics, timed to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the rediscovery of Gregor Mendel's laws. 64 While their public statements celebrated scientific cooperation and achievement, their correspondence constantly referred to the Lysenkoist threat.
There was now a third committee: the Golden Jubilee Committee, designed explicitly as a professional alternative to Muller and Cook's confrontational tactics. The GSA's new president, Curt Stern, enthusiastically endorsed the idea; Irwin, the former secretary-treasurer, would chair, joined by four other moderates (including Dunn). The committee's main responsibility was to celebrate Mendel's achievements. In practice, this meant the development of appropriate events and materials for the 1950 GSA meeting, including an educational pamphlet and a publicity campaign. Irwin offered the Golden Jubilee Committee to his peers as a moral model of how to deal with the media, the public, and their scientific colleagues. Muller's frantic, doom-filled letters only reinforced Irwin's belief that unchecked elements within the GSA were dragging the organization into politics and scandal instead of advancing its scientific mission.
It was not that Irwin thought that the GSA should remove itself from the Lysenko controversy; rather, he disapproved of what he called the CCAGP's negative approach. As he phrased it in a letter requesting funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, "It is the definite feeling of this committee that the best answer to the anti-genetics propaganda is to make plans for a program at this Golden Jubilee which will put principal emphasis on the accomplishments of genetics in a very positive manner." 65 This particular wording was neither accidental nor specially tailored for a funding agency; both Irwin and Singleton used nearly identical language whether they were inviting members to join the committee, reporting to the GSA's officers, or corresponding with the local arrangements chair, corporate donors, a U.S. congressman, or the public relations firm hired to handle the event. 66 Neither man ever committed the reasons for his objection to paper; the merits of a positive rather than a negative campaign were apparently self-evident. Singleton's comments to Irwin in March of 1950 are typical: "Personally I should like to see the Committee under this name [the Committee to Counteract Anti-Genetics Propaganda] discontinued, and set up as a committee to give full publicity to the contributions that genetics is making. . . . I think we should not even grant the anti-genetics propaganda a place in the records of the Genetics Society of America, but that any committee which works to publicize the science of genetics should have a positive rather than a negative name." 67 The correspondence between Singleton and Irwin gives the distinct impression that they simply considered Muller's tactics distasteful: his positions were almost beside the point. In hoping to avoid controversy, their views were not so different than those of Dunn, who despaired of worsening relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union; but they also reflect an assumption that professional societies should not be in the business of furthering public controversy. 68 The 1950 GSA meeting in Columbus, Ohio, formed the centerpiece of the Golden Jubilee Committee's plans. While the first day of the four-day meeting focused on research papers, the remaining three days celebrated the achievements of Mendel and genetics. Richard Goldschmidt, one of the father figures of genetics, kicked off the proceedings with a keynote address on "The Impact of Genetics on the Biological Sciences." Other key speeches addressed historical aspects of genetics, the physical basis and physiology of the gene, cytogenetics, medical genetics, and agricultural genetics. The presidents of both the American Society of Naturalists and the ASHG dedicated their addresses to the topic as well. Finally, Julian Huxley, the famed British biologist and past secretary-general of UNESCO, capped off the ceremonies by discussing "Genetics, Evolution, and General Thought."
69 Several of the papers presented at the meetings were later collected and published as an edited volume under Dunn's direction. 71. Singleton's letter to his congressman requesting the postage stamp echoed the stereotypical image of the Lysenko controversy favored by the news media but simultaneously reiterated his insistence on positive action: "From time to time there crops up some anti-genetics propaganda, mostly from foreign sources, and in the U.S.S.R. genetics as such has been practically abandoned. The Executive Committee of the Genetics Society feels that a strong program of publicizing the accomplishments of Genetics will do more to counteract any such propaganda than anything else we can do. I think this semi-centennial celebration is an excellent opportunity for bringing forth the accomplishments of the science of Genetics as a pure science and also in plant and animal improvement." Singleton to Congressman W. Kingsland Macy, 9 Mar 1950, GSA, Box 7, Folder Golden Jubilee, Correspondence #1.
Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Westinghouse Corporation, to oversee their operations.
72 This extraordinary effort was made possible by a sleight of hand involving a $7,500 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, originally intended for a publication; although two publications were eventually released, both were mostly an excuse to hire Pendray and Leibert as the GSA's publicist. 73 Dunn handled all of the publicity arrangements, including negotiating the contract with Pendray and Leibert and securing the services of his friend John Pfeiffer, a former science editor for CBS, to write a popular "Penguin-style" pamphlet on the accomplishments of Western genetics. 74 With input from Dunn and Singleton, the publicity firm issued news releases, mailed pitch letters, created advertisements, and compiled press kits for the Golden Jubilee celebrations. By November 1950, over 22,100 copies of the pamphlet had been sold-numbers undoubtedly increased by Pendray and Leibert's efforts to negotiate bulk sales to schools, libraries, and agricultural businesses such as Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Company and DeKalb Hybrid Seed Company. 75 According to the company's report to Dunn, their efforts successfully ensured that the "Genetics Golden Jubilee dominated the picture in Columbus, Ohio. . . . The Golden Jubilee activities of the Society were, in our judgment, successful in their purpose of focusing widespread attention on the fundamental contributions of modern genetics, and the role of Mendel as founder of the field." Unfortunately, the national newspaper clippings from the celebration have since been lost, but it is clear that the firm succeeded in drawing significant media attention to the Golden Jubilee program. 76 The New York Times, for one, featured daily stories on the Golden Jubilee. None of these directly mentioned either Lysenko or Soviet genetics; the articles instead focused on the practical applications of and recent experimental evidence for the gene. They did, however, make subtle attempts to counter charges of scientific dogma. In language surely adopted from a Pendray and Leibert press release, one article quoted Snyder to the effect that "one of the most far reaching" mistaken beliefs about heredity held that "if a certain trait is demonstrated to have a genetic basis it is held not subject to environmental modification . . . and conversely, if a personal trait is shown to have been influenced by the environment many believe genetics had nothing to do with it."
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Most of the firm's press releases stressed positive achievements. Rather than focusing on so-called basic research, however, these releases not so subtly stressed the practical applications of Mendelian genetics. Without mentioning Lysenko's name, most of the releases described improvements to American lives, such as increased agricultural productivity, the production of inexpensive antibiotics, and early diagnosis of some medical problems, reached through Western genetics. (Undoubtedly these sorts of accomplishments were of interest to the Rockefeller Foundation.) Another more pointedly explained that the pamphlet "is intended to furnish popular information on a science which is steadily contributing to increased health and prosperity in America."
78 Not all of the press releases muzzled political commentary on Lysenko's theories; one particularly heavy-handed document explained that the pamphlet provided all the background information needed to understand the "tempest in the scientific world." The statement proclaimed that "The Russians deny the existence of genes, the biological architects of heredity," but that "Mendelian geneticists . . . have been unable to get the results claimed by Lysenko. Unless the results can be duplicated elsewhere, the scientific verdict can only be 'invalid. '" 79 The geneticists were generally pleased with Pendray and Leibert's efforts. Dunn praised the efforts of Robert McDevitt, the publicist who represented the GSA, in a letter to one of the company's principals, writing, "considerable success was attained in getting the right kind of notice of the Genetics Society anniversary meetings." Even though occasional newspapers, such as the New York Times, insisted on reporting on controversy instead of consensus, "we were particularly glad to avoid overemphasis upon the differences with the Russians and I think this was achieved." 80 Using a public relations firm allowed media-skittish scientists like Dunn to speak their minds without actually appearing in a byline or in an interview. Indeed, Dunn so enjoyed the experience of working with the firm that he expressed the hope that more scientific societies would follow their example.
If the enduring memory of Gregor Mendel as the founding father of genetics is any indication, the GSA's Golden Jubilee was wildly successful. Dunn, Irwin, and Singleton brought their positive message directly to tens of thousands of pamphlet readers; many more read the glowing newspaper reports of the proceedings. Because their statements rarely strayed from the achievements of the past and the promise of the future, their activities elicited few protests. Unlike Muller, who received caustic letters almost every time he published an article on Lysenkoism, the Golden Jubilee Committee received only praise. It does give one pause, however, to reflect on the GSA's rather circumscribed notion of success. Political action on behalf of scientific societies could only extend so far in Cold War America.
CON CLU S I O N
During the years immediately following the end of World War II, a brief flowering of scientific activism unfolded in the public sphere, as numerous studies of the so-called atomic scientists have clearly demonstrated. 81 The Federation of American Scientists and the National Committee on Atomic Information attempted to reach the public directly through speaker's bureaus, information packets, radio appearances, and filmstrips, and they encouraged the public to participate in letter-writing campaigns in support of civilian control of atomic energy. Jessica Wang and Megan Barnhart have convincingly argued that these efforts should be seen in the context of a Deweyian conception of an associationist public, in which an active and informed citizenry could make rational decisions for the public good. 82 In the case of the atomic scientists, public engagement proved short-lived, as the growing anti-Communist movement managed to squelch most debate by the end of the 1940s. 83 Simply put, physicists needed security clearances, and maintaining them required a clean political record. Those scientists who continued to influence public policy on the control and development of nuclear arms and energy largely did so as government advisors operating within a technocratic system, rather than as public intellectuals engaging in the public sphere. 84 But things could have been different for the sizable group of biologists who worked on projects less obviously useful for military applications. Although a fairly high proportion of biologists had-and continued to nurse-leftist affiliations, the kind of research they engaged in was less likely to require security clearances. Moreover, private foundations continued to sponsor genetics research well into the postwar period, reducing its dependency on federal grants. At the same time, geneticists found themselves largely on the margins of federal policy-making. Here was an issue-Lysenkoism-that would seem to be a matter of great political concern, but attracted little government attention aside from a few letters from a former Vice President known for his leftist sympathies and State Department interest in a short series of Voice of America radio broadcasts. 85 Moreover, given geneticists' ongoing commitment to Soviet-American friendship and the increasingly frosty relationship between the two countries, it is not clear that increased federal involvement would have aided the geneticists' goal of supporting their Soviet colleagues. Instead, they turned to the public. As Nikolai Krementsov has argued, part of their motivation was to provide ammunition for the geneticists still working within the Soviet Union.
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From their correspondence, however, it is clear that American geneticists held a deep-seated belief in the power of an educated, democratically engaged public to influence science policy across the globe. The fact that they failed to offer any sort of explanation for how that public might wield its power does not make their insistence on the point any less historically relevant. The Lysenko controversy was the first extended contact many geneticists had with high-profile media organizations. They were surprised when they encountered resistance to their nuanced message from publishers, readers, and their colleagues, and they made what they later considered to be mistakes. The lessons they learned-both as individuals and as professional renegadesinfluenced their interactions with the public long after Lysenko's fall from power. 87 Muller's encounters with the letter-writing public moreover revealed that scientific authority in the public sphere could be tenuous. While the public welcomed leading scientists' commentary on scientific issues, they demanded scientific justification for these positions. It was not enough, Muller learned, to use one's position as a scientist to condemn political events elsewhere. While both Muller and Dunn experienced significant criticism of their social and political views in the Saturday Review of Literature, no one criticized their attempts to explain American or Soviet science. Instead, readers questioned their political motivation or expertise. Taking a position on a controversial issue might be acceptable, but the educated public expected scientists to justify these views with seemingly objective evidence. The scientists' professional colleagues reinforced a limited role for scientists as political figures by actively discouraging political commentary. It might be acceptable for a scientist to court media attention, but only as an individual citizen rather than as an emissary of the scientific community. Equally important, the geneticists learned that successful media campaigns required a sophisticated strategy. On their own, Dunn and Dobzhansky found it difficult to draw attention to their translation of Lysenko's work; using the help of a public relations firm, in contrast, the GSA secured coverage for their Golden Jubilee in almost every major American newspaper. Their experience with Pendray and Leibert suggested that media contacts, press kits, and professionally written news releases might be worthwhile investments. Although geneticists' opinions might hold sway on the printed page, the GSA's more savvy members recognized that they needed help in gaining access to those pages. And whereas op-ed pieces and Muller's diatribes alienated readers, seemingly innocuous public affairs pamphlets could transform public attitudes.
The grand irony at the heart of the American response to Lysenkoism is that the geneticists involved hoped to condemn a politically motivated scientific program without drawing too much attention to either their scientific or political objections. Moreover, both the individual scientists and the GSA hoped to wage this campaign by reaching as many people as possible in the popular press. What at first seems like a remarkably bull-headed or even perverse approach to conflict only makes sense when considered through a complex set of motivations that extend well beyond the self-interest typically associated with postwar science publicity: the geneticists described in this article were driven by personal friendships, political commitments, professional obligations, and an enduring belief in the power of individuals to shape public opinion. When geneticists voiced their opinions on radio programs, feature articles, and letters to the editor, they were not only speaking to the public, but speaking as members of the public. If we, as historians, want to know why scientists did these things, we must be willing to consider scientists as historical actors with multiple identities well beyond their professional affiliations. 88 In the case of Lysenkoism, that means recognizing that political and personal divisions shaped geneticists' individual and collective responses almost as much as, if not more than, the desire to establish scientific legitimacy and the institutional rewards that would accompany it. In arguing that we take seriously the question of personal motivation, I am not making an impassioned plea for a return to biography as the primary method for understanding scientists' actions. Rather, this account is offered in hope that 88 . Moore, Disrupting Science (ref.
2) offers a much-needed brief for a broader view of scientists' motivations beyond mere resource allocation.
